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NOTES
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS:
STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL PARAMETERS
The right of handicapped individuals to obtain and maintain
employment free from practices that are discriminatory in intent or
effect is a nascent legal doctrine. Significant federal legislation re-
quiring the elimination of discriminatory barriers and the imple-
mentation of affirmative action programs has considerably ex-
panded employment opportunities for the handicapped. Sections
5031 and 5041 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and regulations
promulgated thereunder by the Departments of Labor and of
Health, Education and Welfare,3 provide the federal government's
primary operative mechanisms for the enforcement of employment
rights of the handicapped. In addition to these statutory provisions,
the constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process
may provide the handicapped with a remedy in appropriate dis-
crimination cases.4 At the present time, however, it is unlikely that
Title VII will be amended to bring the handicapped within its pro-
tections. 5 Consequently, in the absence of a uniform national stan-
dard, the employment rights of the disabled in the private sector
remain subject to whatever differing legislation the states may
enact.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. V 1975) (prohibiting employers receiving federal contracts in
excess of $2500 from discriminating against the handicapped).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975) (prohibiting recipients of federal assistance from dis-
criminating against or denying benefits of programs to the handicapped solely because of the
handicap).
3. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 (1978); 45 id. § 84; 43 Fed. Reg. 2138 (1978) (to be codified in 45
C.F.R. § 85).
4. See, e.g., Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Gurmankin v. Costanzo,
411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See generally Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal
Treatment; The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the
Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAw. 855 (1975); Note, Eqdal Employment and the
Disabled: A Proposal, 10 CoLum. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 457 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Proposal]; Note, The Right of Handicapped Children to an Education: The Phoenix of
Rodriguez, 59 CoRNELL L. Rav. 519 (1974); Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to
Effectuate the Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61 GEo. L.J. 1501 (1973).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); see notes 178-79 infra & accompa-
nying text.
6. See Wright, Equal Treatment of the Handicapped by Federal Contractors, 26 EMORY
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Although little case law interpreting the statutory and constitu-
tional rights of handicapped individuals is available, litigation is
burgeoning. Recent federal court decisions reveal a judicial inclina-
tion to afford broad meaning and application to the statutory man-
dates.7 The expansive readings of the statutory definition of handi-
capped individuals amplify the potential impact of the Rehabilita-
tion Act for federal contractors and for recipients of federal funds
covered by the Act.' Additional interpretative issues arising under
the Act include what the "reasonable accommodation" obligation
imposed by the Act entails' and whether an individual is "qualified"
for particular employment despite a handicapping condition.10
The depressed employment status of handicapped individuals is
both a product of prejudice and ignorance and of justifiable occupa-
tional restrictions imposed by debilitating conditions." In response
to those factors, legislative and judicial action in the area of employ-
ment rights of the handicapped seeks to maximize the unrealized
labor potential of this historically mistreated portion of society
within the limitations of legitimate economic and physical con-
straints. 2 By analyzing existing legislation, regulations, and case
L.J. 65, 65 (1977); Proposal, supra note 4, at 462. Concerning the prohibition of state laws
that may be inconsistent with federal statutory provisions, see 45 C.F.R. § 84.10 (1978); Id.
§ 84 app. A, subpt. A, no. 14, at 408.
7. See Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3463 (Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-711); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre,
558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Crawford v.
University of N.C., 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F.
Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. W. Va. 1976). But cf. Doe v. New York
Univ., 442 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (exhaust administrative remedies first); Wood v.
Diamond State Tel. Co., 440 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Del. 1977) (no private cause of action intended
under § 503 of Rehabilitation Act); Moon v. Roadway Express, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D.
Ga. 1977) (no private cause of action authorized by § 793 of Rehabilitation Act); Rogers v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (same).
8. An individual need only have a record of, or be regarded as having, a handicap in order
to qualify for the Act's protection. See note 16 infra & accompanying text.
9. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1978); 41 id. § 60-741.6(d); see notes 89-91 infra & accompanying text.
10. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (1978); 41 id. § 60-741.2; see notes 134-36 infra & accompanying text.
11. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 234, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION & THE PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED WORKER 5 (1961); Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra
note 4, at 857-58; Herlick, Rehabilitation of Industrially Injured Workers, 2 WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION L. Rav. 495 (1975); Symposium on the Rights of the Handicapped-Historical
Overview: From Charity to Rights, 50 TEMPLE L.Q. 953 (1977).
12. The federal regulations detail the prohibitions against the discrimination and the em-
ployer's obligation to accommodate reasonably the qualified handicapped worker, absent an
affirmative showing by the employer that undue hardship would result from such accommo-
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law interpreting the statutory mandates, this Note will provide a
survey of the current status of employment rights of the handi-
capped and suggest an administrative framework for alleviating
weaknesses in existing government programs.
DEFINITIONAL AND STATISTICaL FRAMEWORK
The Rehabilitation Act defines a handicapped individual as
any individual who (A) has a physical or mental disability which
for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial handi-
cap to employment and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit
in terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation
services .... [S]uch term means any person who (A) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, (B) has a record of
such an impairment, or (C) is regarded as having such an impair-
ment."
Although individuals with severe handicaps are the principal con-
cern of the Act,"4 persons having physical or mental disabilities of a
lesser degree also are protected. 5 Indeed, the Act extends to individ-
uals with no disability if the recipient of federal funds or the federal
contractor perceives the individual as handicapped and treats him
as such.'" The regulations also define as handicaps certain condi-
dation. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1978); 41 id. § 60-741.6(d). Defining the proper balance between
these requirements to the mutual satisfaction of both the employer and the handicapped
employee has proved futile. See notes 95-98 infra & accompanying text.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (Supp. V 1975). "Major life activities" include communication,
ambulation, self-care, socialization, education, vocational training, transportation, and hous-
ing, as well as employment.
14. 45 C.F.R..§ 84 app. A, subpt. A, no. 3, at 403-04 (1978).
15. In the appendix to the final regulations issued by the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare implementing the antidiscriminatory mandates of § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, the Secretary notes, "The Department continues to believe, however, that it has no
flexibility within the statutory definition to limit the term to persons who have thosb severe
permanent, or progressive conditions that are most commonly regarded as handicaps." Id. §
84 app. A, subpt. A, no. 3, at 403.
16. This would include (1) individuals with a record of a handicapping condition, such as
mental or emotional illness, cancer, and heart disease; (2) individuals who have been misclas-
sified as having a handicap, such as a misdiagnosis of mental incapacity; and (3) individuals
regarded as having a handicap that substantially impairs employability but which techni-
cally is not a mental or physical limitation, such as disfiguring scars or other cosmetic
abnormalities. Id.; 41 id. § 60-741 app. A, at 397; see Wright, supra note 6, at 68-69. An
employer may consider prior history of a disability relevant to the position sought under
proper circumstances. See, e.g., Spencer v. Toussaint, 408 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Mich, 1976)
(denial of employment as city bus driver based upon prior history of mental illness).
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tions that are voluntary at their inception, such as alcoholism and
drug addiction.' 7
The most significant restriction on the statutory definition of
handicapped is the phrase "substantially limits"; the precise mean-
ing of this phrase remains unclear."8 In the context of employment,
a substantial limitation relates to the "degree that the impairment
affects employability."'" The Act, however, applies only to individu-
als whose impairments are mental or physical; conditions such as
homosexuality or economic disadvantage do not qualify an individ-
ual for protection under the Act despite the substantial limitations
such "handicaps" might impose on employability. 0 Judicial inter-
pretations of the definition of a handicapped individual are consis-
tent with these statutory guidelines.'
17. 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A, subpt. A, no. 4, at 404-05 (1978). The regulations, however, do
not prohibit the employer from considering these conditions in assessing the individual's
qualifications for employment or promotion. The employer merely is prohibited from deny-
ing the applicant employment solely on the basis of the addiction. See Davis v. Bucher, 451
F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (ex-heroin addicts); Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth.,
399 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 588 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3792 (June 27, 1978) (No. 77-1427) (ex-heroin addicts).
Commentators have criticized the definitional approach of the legislation for being over-
broad and for rendering effective implementation infeasible. Central among the concerns
voiced by critics of the definition is that the severely handicapped, who are most in need of
protection, will receive diffused and unsatisfactory attention. Moreover, the lack of common
characteristics among members of the class labeled "handicapped" arguably places unwieldy
burdens on employers. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 6, at 106. The regulations acknowledge
these criticisms but reject the argument that the severely handicapped are inadequately
protected as a result of the broad definition. 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A, subpt. A, no. 3, at 403
(1978).
18. The Secretary observed in the Appendix to the HEW regulations that "the Department
does not believe that a definition of this term is possible at this time." 45 C.F.R. § 84 app.
A, subpt. A, no. 3, at 403 (1978).
19. "[A] handicapped individual is substantially limited if he or she is likely to experience
difficulty in securing, retaining or advancing in employment because of a handicap." 41 id.
§ 60-741.2.
20. Absent a concomitant physical or mental disability, discrimination on the basis of such
handicaps must be redressed by alternate means. 45 id. § 84 app. A, subpt. A no. 3, at 403.
21. A handicap was found in the following cases: Davis v. Southeastern Community
College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3463 (Jan. 9, 1979) (No.
78-711) (hearing impairment); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977) (blind-
ness); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977) (vision in only one eye); Davis v.
Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (former heroin addiction); Crawford v. University
of N.C., 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (deafness); Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp.
75 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (epileptic); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (epileptic); Bartels v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (mobility-
handicapped); Spencer v. Toussaint, 408 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (mental illness).
No handicap was found in the following decisions: Grimard v. Carlston, 567 F.2d 1171 (1st
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Current estimates reveal that eleven to thirty-five million Ameri-
cans suffer from handicaps." The number of employable individuals
within this category is estimated conservatively between seven and
fourteen million.2s These figures, however, fail to reflect the number
of "non-traditionally" handicapped persons included under the
Rehabilitation Act.2 4
Only a small percentage of the handicapped actually are em-
ployed. 2 Despite statistics indicating that handicapped workers
perform as well or better than nonhandicapped employees,26 the
handicapped have the highest unemployment rate of any group in
the United States.27 A primary factor contributing to this situation
is employers' fear that hiring the disabled will increase insurance
costs. The available research indicates, however, that this concern
is unfounded.M Moreover, the societal benefits of maximizing the
labor potential of handicapped persons through accommodation
and suitable placement clearly outweigh the speculative costs of
such practices. 29 Indeed, the federal statutory mandates-may make
the failure to comply more expensive than the voluntary adoption
of affirmative hiring practices.".
Cir. 1978) (fractured ankle); Federal Employees for Non-Smokers' Rights v. United States,
446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978) (non-smokers); Doe v. New York Univ.; 442 F. Supp. 522
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (mental disability).
22. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. _, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6373, 6421; Hearings on H.R. 8395 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of
the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 570-71 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings]; NATIONAL INSTITUTES ON REHABILITATION AND HEALTH SERVICES,
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON REHABILITATION AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 2422
(1971).
23. See Senate Hearings, supra note 22, at 265; 118 CONG. REC. 3321 (1972) (remarks of
Sen. Williams).
24. See DeLury, Equal Job Opportunity for the Handicapped Means Positive Thinking
and Positive Action, 26 LABOR L.J. 679, 681 (1975). Congressional estimates of the number of
handicapped persons under § 504 coverage range from 28 to 50 million. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess.-, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6400, 6406.
25. S. REP. No. 319, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973) (estimates only 800,000 employed); 118
CONG. REc. 3321 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
26. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 234, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION AND THE PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED WORKER 6-8 (1961); Herlick, supra note 11,
at 498-99.
27. Address by Dr. Andrew S. Adams, U.S. Dep't of HEW, reprinted in J. REHAB. 18 (May-
June, 1976).
28. See generally Herlick, supra note 11.
29. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1312 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (noting decrease in amount of financial support society must provide and the
increased revenue from income taxes that results when retarded are employed.
30. Incentive for implementing affirmative action mandates may derive from the annual
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THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Section 503-Federal Contractors
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act31 and the regulations pro-
mulgated thereunder require that employers entering into procure-
ment contracts or subcontracts in excess of $2500 with any federal
agency or department take affirmative steps to employ qualified
handicapped individuals.3 This requirement applies to those who
contract with the government for the furnishing of nonpersonal
property or services such as construction, utility, research, or trans-
portation.3 4 As a result of this broad coverage, section 503 applies
to approximately one-half of all businesses in the United States.3
Although section 503 does not require goals, timetables, or work-
force analysis, the affirmative action policy guidelines do require
outreaching efforts to notify applicants and employees of the con-
tractor's obligation to employ and advance handicapped workers 5
Federal contractors also must remove physical and systemic bar-
riers that might impede a qualified handicapped person's efforts to,
secure or advance in employment. 7 The extent of this obligation,
tax savings available to employers that make their facilities accessible to handicapped work-
ers. Also, sanctions such as potential back pay awards, fines, contract cancellations, or dis-
qualification from future contracts deter employers from violating the Rehabilitation Act
mandates. See Jackson, Affirmative Action for the Handicapped and Veterans: Interpretative
and Operational Guidelines, 29 LABOR L.J. 107 (1978).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. V 1975), which reads in pertinent part:
Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or
agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (in-
cluding construction) for the United States shall contain a provision requiring
that, in employing persons to carry out such contract the party contracting with
the United States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in em-
ployment qualified handicapped individuals as defined in section 706(6) of this
title. The provisions of this section shall apply to any contract in excess of $2500
entered into by a prime contractor in carrying out any contract for the procure-
ment of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction) for
the United States.
32. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 (1978). The Department of Labor (DOL) issued the regulations; the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) is charged with enforcement.
33. Id. §§ 60-741.4, 60-741.2.
34. Id. § 60-741.3. As such, § 503 generally includes defense contractors, space program
contractors, construction companies, and equipment and supply merchants.
35. Special Report, Affirmative Action: Opening Doors to Employment, [1976] 1 AMicus
16 (publication of the National Center for Law & the Handicapped).
36. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.4(d),(f)(1978).
37. Physical accommodation is divided into facility modification, equipment modification,
and job redesign. Systemic barriers consist of policies, practices, procedures, selection cri-
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though, is limited by the contractor's size and resources and by the
adequacy of the existing practices. 8 For contracts in excess of
$50,000 with contractors having fifty or more employees, section 503
imposes the further obligation of preparing a written 'affirmative
action program subject to annual update and review."
The general principle established by the Rehabilitation Act is
that handicapped persons may not be denied employment or ad-
vancement solely because of their handicap."0 In compliance with
this principle, federal contractors must limit any physical and men-
tal requirements for employment to job-related factors." This limi-
tation also applies to pre-employment inquiries regarding a disabil-
ity and to any medical examinatiofis required for employment."
Thus, a handicapped applicant for employment must be evaluated
solely according to his or her ability to perform the functions related
to the particular job. Personnel policies, job requirements, and med-
ical standards that exclude handicapped individuals on the basis of
criteria irrelevant to job performance must be eliminated. For ex-
ample, an otherwise qualified deaf individual cannot be barred from
employment as a printer absent an affirmative showing by the fed-
eral contractor that hearing is essential to either job performance or
safety.
Beyond requiring that job qualifications be related to actual per-
formance, section 503 mandates that federal contractors make rea-
sonable accommodation for the physical and mental limitations of
teria, or decision making criteria that may be discriminatory in effect. See Id. § 60-741.6(b);
Jackson, supra note 30, at 109.
38. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(f) (1978). Federal contractors must justify any criteria which tend
to exclude handicapped persons by demonstrating that they arise from a legitimate "business
necessity." Id. § 60.741-6(c)(2). Compare this requirement with § 504, which places the
additional burden on recipients of HEW funds to show that alternative, less discriminatory
criteria are unavailable. 45 id. § 84.13(a).
39. 41 id. § 60-741.5(a),(b).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975).
41. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(2) (1978). The regulation provides:
Whenever a contractor applies physical or mental job qualification require-
ments in the selection of applicants or employees for employment or other
change in employment status such as promotion, demotion, or training to the
extent that qualification requirements tend to screen out qualified handicapped
individuals, the requirements shall be related to the specific job or jobs for which
the individual is being considered and shall be consistent with business necess-
ity and the safe performance of the job.
Id.
42. Id. § 60-741.6(c)(1)-(3).
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the disabled worker.43 Failure to accommodate may be justified by
showing that undue hardship would result." Factors relevant to a
determination of undue hardship include business necessity and
financial costs.4" Thus, a deaf applicant cannot be barred from em-
ployment if, for example, providing an interpreter would not impose
an undue hardship.
Section 503 may be enforced only administratively." A disabled
individual who believes that a federal contractor has violated sec-
tion 503 must file a complaint with the Department of Labor within
180 days of the alleged violation.4 7 When a complaint is filed by an
employee of a contractor, the employer is given an opportunity to
resolve the dispute internally. If no agreement is reached between
the employer and employee within 60 days, the Department, or
other appropriate agency, will conduct an investigation. If the inves-
tigation reveals that the employer has not complied with the re-
quirements of the Act, efforts will be made to secure compliance
within a reasonable time. 8 If all informal means fail, other enforce-
ment procedures available include: (1) judicial enforcement, (2)
withholding progress payments, (3) termination of the contract, or
(4) disqualification of the contractor from entering into future con-
tracts.49 The emphasis of the enforcement process clearly is placed
upon informal, conciliatory resolution whenever possible.
Courts have viewed section 503's administrative enforcement
mechanism as a basis for refusing to imply a private right of action."
This conclusion is based upon an application of the four criteria
articulated by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash for determining
whether a private remedy is implicit in a federal statute:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted,-that is, does the statute create a fed-
43. Id. § 60-741.6(d).
44. Id.
45. Id.; see note 78 infra & accompanying text.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (Supp. V 1975).
47. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.26 (1978).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 60-741.28.
50. E.g., Wood v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 440 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Del. 1977); Moon v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F.
Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Wright, supra note 6, at 90-91. See also Crawford v. University
of N.C., 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (discusses but does not decide the issue).
51. 422 U.S. 66 (1974).
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eral right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication
of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a
remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law?5"
Under both the second and third criteria of the Cort test, section 503
arguably does not confer a private remedy. The explicit grhnt of an
administrative remedy has been interpreted by the courts as reflect-
ing an intent by the Congress not to provide a private right of action;
to allow such an action would be incompatible with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme. The failure of efforts to extend
Title VII 4 to include handicapped individuals further supports this
determination. 5 Although there is authority to the contrary," future
efforts to enforce section 503 through private judicial means most
likely will prove unsuccessful.
Section 504-Recipients of Federal Funds
Section 50457 and related regulations58 apply to any employer re-
52. Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
53. Wood v. Diamond State Tel. Co, 440 F. Supp. 1003, 1009 (D. Del. 1977). The court in
Wood distinguished the legislative histories of §§ 503 and 504, the latter having been held to
imply a private right of action, on the basis of the affirmative action covenant in § 503. The
covenant, which is required by the Act to be inserted into all contracts with employers covered
by § 503, merely imposes contractual duties on the employer. Thus, the range of duties
assumed by a federal contractor under § 503 may not be extended beyond the terms of the
contract to imply a private cause of action. The court also suggested that recognition of a
private remedy would impair the legislative intent to encourage conciliatory resolution of
disputes.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); see note 178 infra.
55. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200, 202-03 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
56. Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The court in
Drennon viewed an implied right of action as the remedy which best fostered the Rehabilita-
tion Act's purpose. Although the court's discussion centered primarily on § 504, the court
concluded that "[allthough the legislative history does not mention section [503], that
factor does not negate the existence of a private cause of action under that statute." Id. at
815.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975).
58. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 2136 (1978) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 85.3).
The § 84.3 regulations apply to recipients of funds administered by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 11,914-which directed the Secre-
tary of HEW to coordinate implementation of § 504 with all federal agencies administering
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ceiving financial assistance from any federal agency." This section
provides that no qualified handicapped person "shall, solely by rea-
son of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."60 A broad defini-
tion has been applied to the term "Federal financial assistance" to
encompass any grant, loan, contract, or other governmental assis-
tance in the form of funds, personal services, and real or personal
property.6
Section 504's general proscription of discrimination solely on the
basis of a handicapping condition requires nondiscriminatory re-
cruitment, hiring, advancement, wages, and other job-related inci-
dentals.12 Employment practices which are discriminatory in intent
or in effect are prohibited. To satisfy section 504's nondiscrimi-
nation mandate, a handicapped worker must receive "equal oppor-
tunity, not merely equal treatment."" "Thus, in some situations,
identical treatment of handicapped and nonhandicapped persons is
not only insufficient but is itself discriminatory."'" This equal op-
portunity, however, need not produce the same result, same benefit,
or same level of achievement for a handicapped worker as for a
nonhandicapped worker.6" For example, an employer reasonably
may be required to accommodate applicants confined to wheel-
chairs, but the employer need not guarantee employment or ad-
vancement absent a showing that the denial of either was discrimi-
natory.
funds-§ 85.3 of the regulations was added. Section 85.3 establishes the responsibilities,
standards, and guidelines for enforcement of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Each federal
agency is responsible for issuing its own regulations consistent with the general provisions of
the HEW guidelines. 43 Fed. Reg. 2137 (1978) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 85.4). To avoid
conflicting obligations, the regulations provide further that if more than one agency adminis-
ters funds to a number of the same recipients, inter-agency cooperation is required. 43 Fed.
Reg. 2137 (1978) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 85.6).
59. 43 Fed. Reg. 2136 (1978) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 85.2). Examples of employers
that are affected include hospitals, universities, and nursing homes.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975). In Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp.,
446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), Judge Broderick characterized § 504 as a codification of
the constitutional right to equal protection. He noted that the section was introduced origi-
nally to the Congress as a bill to extend Title VII to include the handicapped. Id. at 1323.
61. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f (1978).
62. 45 C.F.R. § 84.11 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 2138 (1978) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. 85.52).
63. Summary Rule and Analysis of Comments by HEW Secretary Joseph A. Califano, Jr.,
43 Fed. Reg. 2134 (1978) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 85).
64. Id.
65. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2) (1978).
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Unlike section 503, affirmative action is not mandated by section
504, but remedial action and self-evaluation are required, and vol-
untary action is encouraged. 6 Recipients employing more than fif-
teen workers also must take steps to notify participants, beneficiar-
ies, applicants, and employees of the employer's nondiscriminatory
policy. 7 If the required self-evaluation reveals policies and practices
that are discriminatory in intent or effect, the recipient must elimi-
nate those effects.
Section 504's provisions regarding employment criteria mirror
section 503's principle that these standards must be job-related.68
Any employment tests used by the recipient of federal funds must
be administered so that only skills relevant to actual job perform-
ance are determinative. 9 If a particular test or other selection crite-
rion tends to exclude the handicapped, the recipient may not use it
if alternative measures with less adverse effects are available.70 This
is true even if the particular test is relevant to actual job skills.
Thus, tests that measure job-related skills, but that also test mental
or physical skills unrelated to job performance, must be adminis-
tered in a manner that emphasizes the relevant job skills and, ide-
ally, does not reflect the irrelevant disability. For example, a written
test may be employed to assess a job applicant's knowledge regard-
ing the performance of a manual task. A deaf applicant, however,
may perform poorly on such a test because of the severe language
deficiency that normally results from a hearing loss, even though the
applicant has the physical ability to perform the job. Under such
circumstances, a practical, rather than a written, examination
would be an appropriate alternative measure. Effective scrutiny of
existing employment criteria to uncover such latent discriminatory
effects thus requires knowledge of both the handicapping conditions
and the collateral effects of particular disabilities.
Pre-employment inquiries about an applicant's handicaps are
prohibited under section 504 to the extent that the inquiries do not
66. Id. § 84.6(a)-(c).
67. Id. § 84.8. Notification may include the posting of notices, the distribution of memo-
randa or other written communications, the placement of notices in the recipient's publica-
tion, or the publication of notices in newspapers or magazines. The notice should contain a
statement that the employer does not discriminate on the basis of handicaps and the identity
of the employee responsible for coordinating the recipient's compliance efforts.
68. Id. § 84.13; 43 Fed. Reg. 2138 (1978) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 85.54).
69. 43 Fed. Reg. at 2138.
70. 45 C.F.R. § 84.13 (1978).
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relate to legitimate interests of the employer. 71 Although a recipient
may question an applicant regarding his ability to operate a motor
vehicle, if that is necessary to job performance, the employer may
not ask whether the applicant's vision is impaired. 7 Employers may
inquire whether an applicant is handicapped if the information is
voluntary and confidential and is used solely to further remedial or
voluntary action to eliminate discriminatory practices or policies.
The purpose of the inquiry, however, as well as the voluntary, confi-
dential nature of the information, must be stated clearly, along with
assurances that failure to provide the information will not adversely
affect consideration of the application.13 Similarly, employers may
require pre-employment medical examinations only if all applicants
are subjected to such examination and if the results of the examina-
tion are used in a nondiscriminatory, job-related manner .7
The recipient of federal funds, like the federal contractor, is re-
quired to reasonably accommodate the physical and mental limita-
tions of otherwise qualified handicapped workers. 75 This duty to
accommodate may be avoided, however, if, after considering the
size and character of the recipient's program and the nature and
cost of the accommodation needed, 78 it imposes an undue hardship
upon the recipient. 7  In contrast to section 503, section 504 suggests
specific examples of the kinds of actions that would satisfy the
requirement of reasonable accommodation. 78
Enforcement of section 504 is achieved through compliance with
the complaint and enforcement procedures of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.11 As with section 503, the emphasis of the proce-
dures is on informal, conciliatory methods of enforcement. A handi-
capped individual who believes that a violation of section 504 has
71. Id. § 84.14; 43 Fed. Reg. 2138 (1978) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 85.55).
72. 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A, subpt. B, no. 18, at 410 (1978).
73. Id. § 84.14(b).
74. Id. § 84.14(c).
75. Id. § 84.12; 43 Fed. Reg. 2138 (1978) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 85.53).
76. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1978).
77. 43 Fed. Reg. at 2138.
78. Reasonable accommodation may include: (1) making facilities used by
employees readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons, and (2) job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition or modification
of equipment or device, the provision of readers or interpreters, and similar
actions.
45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b) (1978).
79. Id. §§ 84.61, 80.6 to 80.10, 81.1 to 81.131.
[Vol. 20:291
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS OF THE HANDICAPPED
been committed must file a complaint with the responsible Depart-
ment official within 180 days of the violation." The Department
then will conduct an investigation to determine whether a violation
has occurred; it will attempt to elicit voluntary compliance if a
violation is discovered. Sanctions, ranging from suspension or ter-
mination of ongoing federal financial assistance to refusal to grant
or contitiue assistance in the future,81 may be imposed if noncompli-
ance cannot be corrected informally. These sanctions may be im-
posed, however, only after notice and opportunity for a hearing have
been provided the noncomplying recipient.8 2
Section 504 enforcement, unlike that of section 503, is not limited
to pursuit of administrative remedies. The majority of courts that
have considered this question have held that a private right of ac-
tion is implicit in section 504.81 Because the enforcement procedure
adopted by section 504 parallels that of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which permits a private remedy,84 and because the section imposes
an affirmative duty on recipients for the especial benefit of handi-
capped persons,8 5 these courts have concluded that a private remedy
80. Id. § 80.7.
81. Id. § 80.8.
82. Id. § 80.8(c).
83. E.g., Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3463 (Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-711); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d
Cir. 1977); United Handicappped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Kampmeir
v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th
Cir. 1977); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Barnes v. Converse College,
436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D.
Pa. 1977); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W. Va. 1976); Sites v. McKenzie, 423
F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. W. Va. 1976).
84. See Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 638 (D.S.C. 1977); Drennon v.
Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. SuLp. 809, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563 (1974). In Lau 2,800 school children of Chinese ancestry claimed that their right to
a meaningful education was denied because they were unable to speak English. The Court
relied on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d), and HEW regulations
promulgated thereunder, to provide relief to the school children. The Court noted that the
Civil Rights Act conferred affirmative rights arising out of the school's contractual obligation
as a recipient of federal funds to conform to the regulations' guidelines. The School had failed
to meet these obligations, and the lower court was directed to fashion the appropriate remedy.
414 U.S. at 569.
When section 504 was amended in 1974, the Conference Committee's Joint Explanatory
Statement noted, "This approach to implementation of section 504, which closely follows the
models of [Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972] would. . . permit a judicial remedy through a private action." 120 CONG. REc. 35017
(1974).
85. See, e.g., United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 1977).
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is consistent with legislative intent. Application of the Cort criteria
to section 504 confirms this determination. 81 Moreover, handi-
capped individuals also may have a cause of action as third party
beneficiaries of the contract between the recipient and the federal
government. 8 A private cause of action, however, may be subject to
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 8
APPLYING THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Reasonable Accommodation
Sections 503 and 504 reqtuire that recipients of federal financial
assistance and federal contractors make reasonable accommodation
for the physical and mental limitations of otherwise qualified handi-
capped applicants and employees unless the employer can demon-
strate that accommodation would impose an undue hardship.89 The
86. 422 U.S. 66 (1975); see notes 52-54 supra & accompanying text.
87. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200, 204 (N.D. Tex. 1977). The contract upon
which handicapped workers may sue as third-party beneficiaries is the written assurance of
compliance with section 504 that recipients must submit to the federal government. See Note,
79 W. VA. L. REv. 398, 405 (1977).
88. E.g., Doe v. New York Univ., 442 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The court expressed
reservations about applying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies:
Although the Court is not overly optimistic as to the expeditiousness or effi-
ciency of such a scheme of administrative enforcement, particularly when it
appears that HEW's enforcement machinery in other areas of civil rights com-
plaints is inefficacious at best, it is simply too early to find this specific adminis-
trative remedy inadequate.
Id. at 523 (footnote omitted). Because of the often unsatisfactory nature of such administra-
tive relief, preliminary injunctions have been issued to prevent irreparable harm. E.g., Ca-
menisch v. University of Tex., No. A-78-CA-061 (W.D. Tex. May 17, 1978); Crawford v.
University of N.C., 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F.
Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977).
89. 45. C.F.R. § 84.12 (1978) (recipients of HEW funds); 43 Fed. Reg. 2138 (1978) (to be
codified in 45 C.F.R. § 85.53) (recipients of federal funds from all other agencies); 41 C.F.R.
§ 60-741.6(d) (1978) (covering federal contractors). The language used in and the obligations
imposed by each of the regulations is virtually identical. 45 id. § 84 app. A, subpt. B, no. 16,
at 408-09 (1978).
Although § 503 imposes the stricter obligation of affirmative action as contrasted with §
504's nondiscriminatory mandate, the regulations view this distinction as irrelevant to the
"reasonable accommodation" requirement. Although affirmative action requires self-
initiated efforts to integrate handicapped persons into the labor force, reasonable accommo-
dation obligations do not arise until the individual applicant or employee makes his particu-
lar needs known to the. employer. A recipient or federal contractor obviously need not accom-
modate a deaf worker by providing an interpreter until such person actually is employed. In
contrast, affirmative action obligations might require the federal contractor to actively solicit
applications from deaf individuals through outreach and notice programs and to anticipate
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scope of the reasonable accommodation obligation, however, has
been defined in general rather than specific terms.
In order to qualify for protection under the Rehabilitation Act, the
handicapped applicant first must show that he is qualified to per-
form the particular job.90 In some circumstances, the applicant's
qualification may be determined with reference to the employer's
obligation to make "reasonable accommodation"; some handi-
capped persons may be qualified to perform certain job skills only
if reasonable accommodation is made for their handicaps. Thus, if
a disabled applicant can demonstrate that but for the employer's
failure to provide reasonable physical modifications or other accom-
modations the applicant would be qualified for employment, the
employer then has the burden of showing undue hardship as a justi-
fication for his failure to accommodate.91
Reasonable accommodation may include modification of work
schedules, job restructuring, physical modification, relocation of
particular jobs or offices to more readily accessible areas, or provi-
sion of interpreters or readers.92 Whether a particular attempt at
accommodation imposes an undue hardship on the employer is de-
termined by the size and type of the employer's operation and the
nature and cost of the necessary accommodation.93 Beyond these
general parameters, however, a reasonableness standard has not
the needs of prospective handicapped employees even though no individual handicapped
applicant or employee has applied. Thus, affirmative action and reasonable accommodation
duties call for dissimilar consideration.
90. See note 135 infra & accompanying text.
91. The regulations are consistent in requiring that the employer demonstrate undue hard-
ship sufficient to excuse accommodation. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 2138 (1978)
(to be codified 45 C.F.R. § 85.53); 41 C.F.R. 60-741.6(d)(1978). Thus, accommodation is
presumed to be reasonable unless it imposes an undue hardship on the contractor or recipient.
Jackson, supra note 30, at 112.
92. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b) (1978). The appendix to § 84 of the regulations expands on these
provisions:
Reasonable uccommodation includes modification of work schedules, including
part-time employment, and job restructuring. Job restructuring may entail
shifting non-essential duties to other employees. In other cases, reasonable ac-
commodation may include physical modifications or relocation of particular
offices or jobs so that they are in facilities. . . that are accessible to and usable
by handicapped persons. If such accommodations would cause undue hardship
to the employer, they need not be made.
Id. § 84 app. A, subpt. B, no. 16, at 409.
93. The size of a program refers to the number of employees, the number and type of
facilities, and the employer's budget; the type of operation refers to the composition and
structure of the workforce. Id. § 84.12(c).
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been articulated. Although area-wide planning rather than case-by-
case analysis has been recommended as a more efficient and effec-
tive approach to "reasonable accommodation" evaluations,94 this
approach has not been adopted. Rather, the existing regulations
maintain that the varying circumstances of an individual em-
ployer's operation precludes the implementation of a uniform stan-
dard or test and that the general nature of the reasonable accommo-
dation requirement permits the flexibility necessary to deal with
these varying circumstances." Consequently, recipients and federal
contractors must examine the case-by-case judicial and administra-
tive interpretations of the statutory guidelines to determine whether
they have satisfied these requirements.
94. See, e.g., Note, Affirmative Action Toward Hiring Qualified Handicapped Individuals,
49 S. CAL. L. REv. 785, 787 (1976). The student author suggests that the reasonableness of
an accommodation expenditure should be evaluated according to a cost/benefit analysis of
the goal of effectively integrating handicapped workers at the lowest possible cost. The cri-
teria for effective integration would include whether the overall expenditures were at least
equaled by the benefits received in return and whether the same benefit might be achieved
at a lower cost. The efficiency of an expenditure would be determined by comparing the
overall taxpayer cost to the overall taxpayer benefit. Thus, an expenditure deemed inefficient
in a particular case might be justified in the larger context of overall taxpayer benefit.
Implementation of a cost/benefit analysis would require area-wide planning rather than case-
by-case adjudication. Otherwise, it would be impossible to determine whether a particular
contractor might accommodate a specific handicap more efficiently than another contractor.
Area-wide planning would permit the gathering of empirical data necessary to implement
accommodation goals effectively.
This approach has appeal, particularly given the virtual absence of precise reasonableness
standards. Moreover, this approach minimizes the possibility that a particular contractor
might be forced to assume substantial accommodation costs when another contractor could
accommodate the employee at significantly less expense. The cost/benefit analysis, however,
seemingly would exclude accommodation that did not produce a benefit at least equal to the
cost incurred. No such limitation is suggested by existing regulations or statutory provisions.
The analysis also would narrow the handicapped individual's already limited choice of em-
ployers by forcing the applicant to work for the employer chosen for him by area-wide plan-
ners. Finally, the overall taxpayer benefit may be irrelevant when the individual contractors,
and not the taxpayers, are required to fund the the necessary accommodations.
95. 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A, subpt. B, no. 16, at 409 (1978), which states:
The weight given to each of these factors in making the determination as to
whether an accommodation constitutes undue hardship will vary depending on
the facts of a particular situation. Thus, a small day-care center might not be
required to expend more than a nominal sum, such as that necessary to equip a
telephone for use by a secretary with impaired hearing, but a large school dis-
trict might be required to make available a teacher's aide to a blind applicant
for a teaching job. Further, it might be considered reasonable to require a state
welfare agency to accommodate a deaf employee by providing an interpreter,
while it would constitute an undue hardship to impose that requirement on a
provider of foster home care services.
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Judicial Interpretation
The decisions construing reasonable accommodation disclose the
uncertain boundary separating the duty to accommodate from the
limitation of undue hardship. Acknowledging the reciprocal nature
of these provisions, courts have defined reasonableness in terms of
time,99 technology, 7 and cost. 8 Although there are no cases inter-
preting reasonable accommodation in employment, judicial appli-
cation of section 504 in contexts other than employment help to
clarify the scope of the employer's accommodation obligation.
In Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority,9 the Court, of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that equal treatment of
the handicapped within the meaning of section 504 cannot be
achieved merely by providing equal facilities if access to these facili-
ties is foreclosed by the absence of adequate public transportation.',"
In Lloyd, the court asserted that, in order to provide the handi-
capped with services "as effective as those provided to others,"
public transportation systems must take affirmative steps to meet
the needs of mobility-handicapped persons.10' The standard applied
to accommodation efforts by transportation authorities is "genuine,
good-faith progress in planning service for wheelchair users and
semiambulatory handicapped persons that is reasonable by com-
parison with the service provided to the general public and that
meets a significant fraction of the actual transportation needs of
such persons within a reasonable time period."''0 2
Applying the reasoning of the court in Lloyd, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit in United Handicapped Federation v.
96. E.g., United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Lloyd v.
Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); Vanko v. Finley, 440 F. Supp. 656,
669 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Bartels v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
97. E.g., Bartles v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226, 232 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (technology necessary
to implement some of proposed solutions not fully advanced); Snowden v. Birmingham-
Jefferson Co. Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ala. 1975), affl'd, 551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.
1977) ("special efforts" obligation to accommodate wheelchair population met within tech-
nological capabilities).
98. E.g., Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158, 1162 (4th Cir. 1978),
cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3463 (Jan. 9, 1979)(No. 78-711); Crawford v. University of N.C.,
440 F. Supp. 1047, 1059 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635
(D.S.C. 1977); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W. Va. 1976).
99. 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
100. Id. at 1284.
101. Id. at 1283-84.
102. Id. at 1282 (quoting 23 C.F.R. § 450 app. B, no. 4, at 118-19 (1978) (emphasis omitted).
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Andre'03 viewed research, design, and planning for future accessibil-
ity of transportation facilities and services as insufficient compli-
ance with the "good-faith progress" standard.' 4 Instead, public
transportation systems were obligated to modify the existing fleet
of buses to conform to the regulations and guidelines, despite the
significant cost that such changes would entail. °0
In Bartels v. Biernat,0 8 the district court permanently enjoined
the Milwaukee County Transit Board and Urban Mass Transit
Administration from purchasing, operating, or funding buses that
were not accessible to mobility-handicapped individuals until the
Board could demonstrate that public transportation facilities and
services were being made available to the disabled in a nondiscrimi-
natory manner. 107 Defining the scope of the Board's obligation under
section 504, the court stated that "[t]he [504] regulations do not
require a full and immediate solution to the problem. What they do
require is that the planning process show that special efforts are
being taken to ensure that the mobility handicapped will be pro-
vided with services equivalent to the rest of the community.' 0 8
Although the court in Bartels did not require the county board to
provide immediate access for the disabled, the decision is not neces-
sarily inconsistent with the determination of the court in Andre that
plans for future accessibility are insufficient. In Vanko v. Finley, '0
the district court reconciled the conflicting conclusions in Bartels
and Andre: "Vague plans for the indefinite future and second-rate
transit for the mobility-handicapped will not satisfy the mandate of
these federal laws, but instantaneous conversion to a transportation
system that is comparable in every minute detail is not required
either."" 0
103. 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977).
104. Id. at 416.
105. Id.
106. 427 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
107. Id. at 233.
108. Id.
109. 440 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
110. Id. at 666. In its attempt to fashion an appropriate remedy, the court in Bartels
succinctly identified the time, technology, and cost issues relevant in determining the reason-
ableness of accommodation:
The Court is confronted with countervailing problems. The plaintiffs are enti-
tled to the benefits of a mass transit system, now. The statute does not allow
the County to wait until the perfect solution is found. At the same time the
technology necessary to implement some of the proposed solutions to the prob-
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Lloyd and Andre indicate that the affirmative duty to reasonably
accommodate the handicapped may involve substantial expense
and that mere good-faith efforts to effect future changes may be
insufficient. Although Bartels excludes the necessity of immediate,
total accessibility, Vanko proscribes the use of vague future plans
as a means of avoiding accommodation obligations while acknowl-
edging that instantaneous compliance may be unrealistic.
These transportation cases demonstrate that federal contractors
and recipients of federal funds may not satisfy the reasonable ac-
commodation goal through indefinite assurances of future compli-
ance with the mandates of sections 503 and 504. Furthermore, an
employer may not claim an undue hardship merely because accom-
modation would involve substantial expense. The employer, how-
ever, may justify a reasonable delay in accommodation if imm.edi-
ate, total accommodation is not feasible.
The obligation to accommodate the handicapped short of undue
hardship has generated conflicts in the area of education similar to
those faced in the transportation cases. Section 504's regulations
require educational institutions receiving federal assistance to elim-
inate discriminatory academic requirements that tend to exclude
qualified handicapped applicants and students.' The regulations
further stipulate that educational "auxiliary aids" must be pro-
vided for students with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking
skills."2 Decisions construing these regulations have focused on cost
lem is not fully advanced, nor has this Court seen any study of the particular
problems facing Milwaukee County in this area. Adding to the difficulty is the
fact that the County is operating a transit system with buses which average
almost 15 years in age. The remedy must provide some access to the transit
system for the plaintiff class and assure that additional improvements will be
made without placing restrictions on the defendants that will necessarily result
in collapse of the transit system.
427 F. Supp. at 232.
111. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(a) (1978) provides:
A recipient. . . shall make such modifications to its academic requirements as
are necessary to ensure that such requirements do not discriminate or have the
effect of discriminating, on the basis of handicap, against a qualified handi-
capped applicant or student. . . . Modifications may include changes in the
length of time permitted for the completion of degree requirements, substitution
of specific courses required for the completion of degree requirements, and adap-
tation of the manner in which specific courses are conducted.
112. Id. § 84.44(d)(1). The auxiliary aid provision provides:
A recipient. . . shall take such steps as are necessary to ensure that no handi-
capped student is denied the benefits of, excluded from participation in, or
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as the primary factor in assessing the reasonableness of accommoda-
tion efforts."'3 Because the regulations are specific regarding provi-
sions for auxiliary aids, efforts to compel institutions to accommo-
date the handicapped have been uniformly successful, regardless of
the cost."' For example, in Hairston v. Drosick,"5 the exclusion of a
spina bifida child from a regular public classroom without justifica-
tion was held to violate section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act."' The
district court concluded that "[s]chool officials must make every
effort to include such children within the regular public classroom
situation, even at great expense to the school system. "I" Decisions
after Hairston have agreed with that court's conclusion that the
affirmative conduct requirement of section 504 applies "even when
such modifications become expensive."" 8
The significance of the education cases to employers subject to
section 503 and 504 reasonable accommodation requirements is
clear: the employer cannot resist efforts to compel accommodation
simply because of expense. At what point expense becomes an
undue hardship, however, remains subject to circumstantial deter-
minations. In Barnes v. Converse College,"' a private college was
required to supply funds for an interpreter to assist a deaf student
during the summer session.2 0 The cost to the school was $750.21
Although the court correctly determined that the possibility of fu-
ture expenditures was irrelevant to the reasonableness of the spe-
otherwise subjected to discrimination under the education program or activity
operated by the recipient because of the absence of educational auxiliary aids
for students with impaired sensory, manual or speaking skills.
113. See, e.g., Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158, 1162 (4th Cir.
1978) cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3463 (Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-711); Crawford v. University of
N.C., 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635
(D.S.C. 1977); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180, 184 (S.D. W. Va. 1976).
114. Id.
115. 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W. Va. 1976).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 184 (emphasis supplied).
118. Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d at 1162 (remanding case to
district court to consider the duty of a college to modify the nursing program to accommodate
a hearing-impaired plaintiff under § 504 regulations). See also Crawford v. Vniversity of N.C.,
440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D. N.C. 1977) (issuing preliminary injunctive relief requiring university
to provide an interpreter or other means of communicating orally presented material to deaf
graduate student); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977) (holding that
private college receiving federal funds is obligated to pay an interpreter for deaf student).
119. 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977).
120. Id. at 639.
121. Id. at 637.
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cific accommodation request, it expressed concern regarding the
potential future burden Converse College would have to bear as a
result of the accommodation obligation.2 '
[I]f the federal government, in all its wisdom, decides that
money should be spent to provide opportunities for a particular
group of people, that government should be willing to spend its
own money (i.e. our taxes) for such purposes and not require that
private educational institutions use their limited funds for such
purposes. 1'
The court conceded that the college did receive federal assistance
but observed that the federal funds were not granted to the college
for the purpose of furnishing auxiliary aids. 124
Criticism of the reasonable accommodation obligation expressed
in Barnes ignores the fact that the duty does not arise until specific
handicapped persons request special concessions. Concerns regard-
ing future expenditures of a similar nature, therefore, are irrelevant
given the singular character of each accommodation of a specific
handicap. Due to the diverse range of conditions classified as handi-
caps by federal legislation, any attempt to predict the cost or even
the nature of potential accommodation needs would be futile. More-
over, as the number of handicapped individuals increases in a school
or place of employment, the cost of accommodation does not neces-
sarily increase concomitantly. One interpreter, for example, may
serve several deaf students or workers effectively. Indeed, the ex-
pense incurred conceivably could decrease as the number of handi-
capped individuals increased. Furthermore, certain accommoda-
tions are single, nonrecurring expenses, such as providing ramps for
mobility-handicapped individuals; no ongoing additional expense
would be necessary as more disabled individuals enrolled in school
or became employed. Finally, the court in Barnes failed to acknowl-
edge the undue hardship exception to the accommodation obliga-
tion. For example, if the anticipated future deluge of deaf students
did occur and if no reasonable accommodation method could be
fashioned, then the college would be relieved of its accommodation
duty upon a showing of this undue hardship.
122. Id. at 638-639.
123. Id. at 639.
124. Id. at 638.
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Analogy to Title VII
Commentators have suggested that the language of the Rehabili-
tation Act may be defined by reference to interpretations of simi-
larly worded provisions found in Title VII.25 Although Title VII
compels employers to, accommodate reasonably the religious needs
of employees in language similar to that used in sections 503 and
504,126 an analogy between the statutes on this issue is inappro-
priate. In Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,' the United States
Supreme Court examined the scope of the employer's statutory duty
to accommodate an employee whose religious beliefs proscribed
work on Saturdays. The majority concluded that TWA was not
required to violate a valid union seniority system agreement to sat-
isfy Title VII when abandonment of the seniority system would
result in unequal treatment of other employees on the basis of their
religious beliefs.'28 The airline had authorized the union steward to
locate an employee willing to exchange shifts with the Sabbatarian-
plaintiff. Although the steward was unsuccessful, the Court deter-
mined that Title VII did not require the airline to resort to any
alternative accommodation efforts. 29 Defining the scope of Title VII
religious accommodation duties, the Court stated that expenditures
beyond a de minimis amount would constitute an undue hardship
within the meaning of the statute.'30 TWA, therefore, had satisfied
the accommodation requirement and was not required to assume
any further responsibility for the Sabbatarian's religious needs.
The standard of undue hardship in the accommodation of reli-
gious needs established by the Court in Hardison is inapplicable to
handicap accommodation cases. Although the majority did not
reach the question whether reasonable accommodation of the em-
125. See note 176 infra.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975). The regulations interpreting Title VII
provide:
[T]he duty not to discriminate on religious grofinds, required by section
703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes an obligation on the part of
the employer to make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of em-
ployees and prospective employees where such accommodation can be made
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1977) (emphasis supplied).
127. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
128. Id. at 81.
129. Id. at 80.
130. Id. at 84.
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ployee's religious beliefs would be contrary to the establishment
clause of the first amendment, first amendment values underlie the
Court's cautious approach to imposing accommodation duties.' 3'
Such tension between competing first amendment values is absent
in situations involving the reasonable accommodation of the disa-
bled; no threat of discrimination against other employees is posed
by efforts to accommodate the handicapped such as providing an
interpreter or widening factory doors. Furthermore, limiting undue
hardship to a de minimis standard in the context of employment
opportunities for the handicapped would undermine the central
purpose of the Rehabilitation Act and contravene specific regula-
tions which describe appropriate accommodation methods necessar-
ily involving more than de minimis expense.1 3 Finally, the repeated
defeat of efforts to expand Title VII to include the handicapped
suggests that handicapped persons merit separate, more extensive
treatment.'3 3 Unlike ethnic background, race, religion, or sex, a
handicapping condition often imposes physical restrictions on em-
ployability that legislators must acknowledge when framing em-
ployer obligations. Furthermore, in order to effectively and intelli-
gently eliminate policies and practices that discriminate against the
handicapped, a discrete body of knowledge regarding the primary
and corollary effects of various disabilities is essential. Thus, al-
though the comparison between Title VII and the Rehabilitation
Act may be attractive in particular instances, Title VII is not dispo-
sitive of reasonable accommodation issues.
Beyond the decisions noted, little assistance is afforded employers
subject to sections 503 and 504 in delineating the boundary between
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. Absent the adop-
tion of a cost/benefit or an alternative empirical system of analysis,
employer obligations will continue to be determined through case-
131. Justice Marshall's dissent noted the potential constitutional violation posed by the
reasonable accommodation of religious beliefs when such accommodation compels employers
to incur substantial costs. Marshall viewed this potential violation as an insufficient basis
for denial of accommodation, however, and observed that "not all accommodations are costly,
and the constitutionality of the statute is not placed in serious doubt simply because it
sometimes requires an exemption from a work rule. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly found
no Establishment Clause problems in exempting religious observers from state-imposed du-
ties, even when the exemption was in no way compelled by the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at
90 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
132. See note 92 supra & accompanying text.
133. See note 179 infra & accompanying text.
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by-case interpretation of the general statutory guidelines. Although
the current system creates uncertain standards, the flexibility nec-
essary to deal with varying circumstances is retained. The available
cases support the contention that a handicapped applicant or em-
ployee is justified in demanding accommodation of his or her spe-
cific needs, even at substantial expense to the employer. Whether
the federal government, rather than an individual recipient or fed-
eral contractor, should bear the cost of accommodation is debatable.
Because the reasonableness of an accommodation is defined in
terms of undue hardship factors, however, an employer should not
be burdened unreasonably by the legislative requirements. More-
over, existing technology may limit the extent of accommodation,
and time constraints may operate to render immediate accommoda-
tion infeasible.
"Qualified Handicapped Person"
The phrase "qualified handicapped person" has created an addi-
tional problem of statutory interpretation. 34 Because the obliga-
tions of employers subject to sections 503 and 504 apply only to
"qualified" disabled individuals, the meaning of this term is a prin-
cipal factor in ascertaining when affirmative action or nondiscrimi-
nating duties arise. With respect to employment, the regulations
define a qualified handicapped individual as "a handicapped person
who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the job in question.' 1 35 The definition of "qualified,"
then is appurtenant to the legislative directive that job evaluations
be restricted to job-related functions; 13' to be qualified, a handi-
capped person need only demonstrate the ability to execute those
functions necessary to job performance. Performance of the essen-
tial skills, however, may entail reasonable accommodation for the
individual's handicap. 137 Courts have expanded on these aspects of
134. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1978); 41 id. § 60-741.2.
135. 45 id. § 84.3(k). Although the statute itself uses the phrase "otherwise qualified
handicapped person," the omission of the word "otherwise" in the regulations signifies that
the proper reading of the statute is to include persons qualified in spite of, rather than except
for, their handicap. Otherwise, "a blind person possessing all the qualifications for driving a
bus except sight could be said to be 'otherwise qualified' for the job of driving. Clearly, such
a result was not intended by Congress." Id. § 84 app. A, subpt. A, no. 5, at 405.
136. See notes 41-43, 71-74 supra & accompanying text.
137. See notes 90-91 supra & accompanying text.
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the statutory terminology in the contexts of education and employ-
ment.
In Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 138 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed a district court's denial of a motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction against public school authorities who refused to
allow a student with vision in only one eye to participate in contact
sports. The court determined that the school had demonstrated
substantial justification for the exclusionary policy based upon the
school's parens patriae interest in protecting the well-being of the
students."' Noting that section 504 prohibits only the exclusion of
qualified handicapped individuals, the court in Kampmeier stated
that the medical evidence indicated that "children with sight in
only one eye are not qualified to play in contact sports because of
the high risk of injury."'4
As subsequent cases indicate, the Kampmeier court's interpreta-
tion of the term "qualified" is misguided. The statutory term
"qualified" refers solely to the capacity to perform. Although the
school may have a legitimate interest in protecting its students'
vision, this concern is irrelevant to the determination of whether a
particular child is qualified to play contact sports. Although the
school might prohibit participation by reason of its parens patriae
interest, this issue cannot be confused with the separate issue of
capacity to perform. Similarly an applicant for employment with a
history of heart trouble could not be labeled unqualified for employ-
ment merely because the employer is concerned for the individual's
physical well-being. The employer, however, may demonstrate in-
dependently that the heart condition renders the applicant incapa-
ble of performing particular job functions.
In Davis v. Southeastern Community College,"'4 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit properly limited the definition of
"qualified" to factors relevant to job performance.112 In Davis' the
Fourth Circuit vacated a district court decision rendered prior to the
138. 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977).
139. Id. at 300.
140. Id. at 299.
141. 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3463 (Jan. 9, 1979)(No. 78-
711). The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Davis provides an articulate and accurate interpretation
of the Rehabilitation Act's purpose and effect, and is a valuable precedent for subsequent
efforts to enforce the statutory mandates.
142. Id. at 1161.
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effective date of the regulations implementing section 504. The dis-
trict court had interpreted "otherwise qualified" to mean that the
handicapped individual had "to [be] otherwise able to function
sufficiently in the poisition sought in spite of the handicap, if proper
training and facilities are suitable and available."' 43 The plaintiff in
Davis suffered from a moderate to severe bilateral hearing loss
which the lower court concluded rendered her unqualified for ac-
ceptance into the defendant-college's nursing program. The district
court contended that the hearing impairment would prevent the
applicant from safely performing her clinical training or her profes-
sional duties following graduation.' Citing the regulations imple-
menting section 504, the court of appeals held that the trial court
should not have considered the applicant's hearing loss in detemin-
ing-whether she was "otherwise qualified."' 4 According to the
Fourth Circuit, the district court's analysis should have been re-
stricted to the applicant's academic and technical qualifications.'4
By shifting the emphasis to job-related criteria, the "otherwise qual-
ified" terminology is given a meaning consistent with the legislative
intent to eliminate discrimination based solely on the presence of a
handicap.
A similar result was reached in Duran v. City of Tampa.'42 In
Duran, the district court refused to grant a motion to dismiss the
complaint of an applicant denied employment as a policemen solely
because of his history of epilepsy. The court noted that the appli-
cant's successful completion of numerous tests required of all appli-
cants rendered him "otherwise qualified" for the position sought.
Thus, the applicant's claim that the employer had violated the
Rehabilitation Act showed a substantial likelihood of success.'48
The statutory language and judicial interpretations of the legisla-
tive provisions indicate that "otherwise qualified" cannot include
qualifications unrelated to job performance. For example, a deter-
mination that a deaf applicant is unqualified cannot rest upon the
applicant's deafness nor upon a legitimate fear that the employee
may be subjected to a greater risk of injury because of the hearing
143. Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 424 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
144. Id. at 1345-46.
145. 574 F.2d at 1161.
146. Id.
147. 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
148. Id. at 78.
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loss. Instead, the employer must demonstrate that hearing is essen-
tial to relevant job functions and that reasonable accommodation
would not compensate adequately for the applicant's incapacity.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
in addition to violating federal statutory provisions, employment
policies or practices in the public sector that discriminate against
handicapped individuals may contravene the constitutional guaran-
tees of due process and equal protection. Determinations relevant
to a constitutional inquiry include whether a rational relationship
exists between a legitimate legislative purpose and the means cho-
sen to effectuate that purpose or whether handicapped persons com-
prise a suspect class, thus requiring strict scrutiny of the regula-
tions.
Due Process
In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,'4 9 the Supreme
Court established a due process standard relevant to employment
rights of the handicapped. The Court in LaFleur invalidated a man-
datory maternity leave policy of the Cleveland Board of Educa-
tion,'5 holding that the policy established an irrebuttable presump-
tion' 5' of physical incompetency that was unsubstantiated by any
rational relation to a valid state interst.'5 - The operation of the
149. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
150. Id. at 651.
151. Judicial hostility to "irrebuttable presumptions" has been manifested in a variety of
contexts. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (invalidating state statute on ground that
the statute's "irrebuttable presumption" of nonresidency for purposes of paying reduced
tuition rates violated due process); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (invalidating state
statute which irrebuttably presumed that all unwed fathers were incompetent to raise their
children); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (reversing district court invalidation
of duration-or-relationship Social Security eligibility requirements for surviving wives and
stepchildren of deceased wage earners as irrebuttable presumptions).
The irrebuttable presumption analysis has been criticized as a confusion of due process and
equal protection scrutiny and as "failing to recognize that irrebuttable presumptions are
nothing more than statutory classifications." Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine
in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. Rav. 1534, 1556 (1974); see Simson, The Conclusive
Presumption Cases: The Search for a Newer Equal Protection Continues, 24 CATH. U. L. REV.
217 (1975); See aLso Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Structures:
Learning from Nature's Future, 84 YALE L.J. 545 (1975); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions:
An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975).
152. 414 U.S. at 647-48, 651.
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policy thereby served to interfere unreasonably with the constitu-
tionally protected right to conceive and bear children. 153
Applying the rationale of LaFleur, the Third Circuit in
Gurmankin v. Costanzol" affirmed a district court holding that a
school district's refusal to consider blind applicants for positions as
teachers for students with no visual impairment deprived a blind
instructor, otherwise qualified to teach, of her due process rights.
The district court viewed the importance of the interest asserted by
the applicant and the relative ease with which a hearing on the issue
of competency could be provided as justification for invalidating the
school's irrebuttable presumption of incompetency.'55 Cases subse-
quent to Gurmankin similarly have invalidated irrebuttable pre-
sumptions of incapacity as violative of due process rights.," Even if
a rational basis exists for concluding that some applicants of an
excluded class may be ineligible for employment, due process re-
153. Id. at 644.
154. 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977).
155. 411 F. Supp. 982, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977). In the context
of employment of the handicapped, analysis of the doctrine of irrebuttable presumptions is
not subject to the refinement articulated in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). In Salfi,
the Supreme Court reversed a district court finding that the duration-of-relationship Social
Security eligibility requirements for surviving wives and stepchildren of deceased wage earn-
ers, which involved irrebuttable presumptions, were unconstitutional. The Court distin-
guished Salfi from LaFleur on the grounds that in Salfi no recognized liberty protected by
the due process guarantee was implicated and that individual hearings on the issue whether
a marital relationship was genuine would entail cumbersome judicial involvement in the
legislative function. 422 U.S. at 772-73.
In employment cases involving handicapped applicants or workers, the objections raised
in Salfi arguably are absent. The interest concerned, namely the right to work, traditionally
enjoys respected status. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). Moreover, strict scrutiny
is applied to any attempts to place an outright ban on the employment of members of groups
that have been subject to past discrimination. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)
(aliens). Also, the individual determinations of capacity would not prove overly burdensome.
See, e.g., Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Beazer v. New York City
Transit Auth., 399 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3792 (June 27, 1978) (No. 77-1427). But see 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 1199
(1978) (criticizing Gurmankin v. Costanzo as a misapplication of the irrebuttable presump-
tion doctrine and suggesting a means-ends rational basis approach to equal protection chal-
lenges to statutes or policies that discriminate against handicapped employees).
156. See, e.g., Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (absolute bar to employ-
ment of former drug users); Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1976)
(absolute bar to employment of any individual with a history of epilpsy); Beazer v. New York
City Transit Auth., 399 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affl'd, 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3792 (June 27, 1978) (No. 77-1427) (total exclusion for all former herion
addicts).
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quires that an individual applicant be given an opportunity to dem-
onstrate that the exclusionary practice is irrational as applied to
him. 5 7
Equal Protection
Equal protection challenges to discriminatory employment prac-
tices and policies have not been as successful as the due process
claims. Two standards of review have been used primarily in equal
protection analysis: strict scrutiny and rational basis.'58 The result
of the case is determined generally by the standard applied: strict
scrutiny results in invalidation of the statute, whereas the statute
survives application of a rational basis test.'59 In an attempt to
afford handicapped individuals the shield of the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review, commentators have urged that disabled persons pos-
sess the characteristics of a suspect class.'60
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,'"' the
Supreme Court defined the requirements of a suspect class. [T]he
class [must be] saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process."'," Although
the handicapped historically have been a stigmatized and politi-
cally weak minority,'63 unequal treatment of the disabled often is
justifiable because of the physical and mental limitations imposed
157. Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 799 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
158. See BARRON & DiamN, CONSTITUMONAL LAW: PRINCUILES AND PoLicY 569-75 (1975).
159. When the strict scrutiny standard is applied, a classification will be upheld only if it
can be demonstrated that it was mandated by a compelling government interest. Application
of the strict scrutiny test generally has proved fatal to the legislation challenged. L. TamE,
AMEmcAN CONsTrrtroNAL LAW § 16-6 (1978); Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8
(1972); see text accompanying note 168 infra.
160. See, e.g., Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 902-08; Note, The Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses: Two Means of Implementing "Integrationism" for Handicapped
Applicants for Public Employment, 27 DEPAuL L. REV. 1169, 1174-83 (1978).
161. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53
n.4 (1938) (establishing the "discrete and insular minority" criteria for suspect class status).
Given the varying nature and degree of disabling conditions, however, the handicapped as a
group are neither discrete nor insular. Indeed, the definition of "handicapped" is subject to
differing interpretation and affords no concrete guideline for suspect class treatment.
162. 411 U.S. at 28.
163. See Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 959 & n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1975); In re G.H.,
218 N.W.2d 441 (S.D. 1974). See generally Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 4.
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by a handicapping condition."4 Indeed, equal treatment of the disa-
bled itself may prove discriminatory." 5 The handicapped thus differ
significantly from groups that are properly labeled suspect classes.
The alternative basis for strict scrutiny analysis, infringement of a
fundamental right, similarly cannot be applied to cases involving
the employment rights of the handicapped: public employment is
not among the interests deemed fundamental by the Supreme
Court. 66
The remaining option available to opponents of discriminatory
employment policies and practices is to challenge the offending reg-
ulation using the less stringent rational basis standard of equal
protection analysis.17 Although the Warren Court invariably ap-
plied the rational basis standard to uphold statutes to equal protec-
tion challenges and applied the strict scrutiny standard to invali-
date them,'6 recent Supreme Court decisions disclose a trend to-
ward a less polarized aproach to equal protection analysis.' 6' This
change is demonstrated by the expansion of suspect classifications'
7°
164. See Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982, 992 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affl'd, 556 F.2d
184 (3d Cir. 1977); Proposal, supra note 4. The Supreme Court impliedly acknowledged these
limitations in dicta, stating "[w]hat differentiates sex from such a non-suspect classes as
intelligence or physical disability, is that the sex characteristic bears no relationship to the
ability to perform or contribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
165. See note 64 supra & accompanying text.
166. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). Fundamental rights
expressly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution include the right to vote, to interstate
travel, to have access to meaningful adjudication, to bear offspring, and to protection of other
intimate personal liberties. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate
travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marriage procreation); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (right to vote); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (freedom of
association).
167. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
168. Id.
169. See Gunther, supra note 159. In Weber v. Aetna Surety & Casualty Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972), the Court emphasized that the legal burdens imposed by a state statute must bear a
significant relationship to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 175. As articulated by the Court,
the essential inquiry in equal protection cases is twofold: "what legitimate state interest does
the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification
endanger?" Id. at 173. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 447 (1972); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971). Justice Marshall in particular has advocated abolition of the
traditional equal protection polarized standards in favor of a means-oriented review. Massa-
chusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Dandrige v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 514-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality) (sex); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage).
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS OF THE HANDICAPPED
and by the creation of an intermediate standard of review.17' This
intermediate standard entails a heightened level of scrutiny, de-
pending on the "constitutional and societal importance of the inter-
est adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis
upon which the particular classification is drawn.' 72
The applicability of this newer equal protection standard is par-
ticularly appealing in cases of discrimination against the handi-
capped in employment. Although handicapped persons do not sat-
isfy the formalistic suspect class qualifications, they historically
have been subject to prejudice and political impotence; and al-
though employment has not been recognized as a fundamental
right, it is acknowledged to be an integral function of meaningful
and productive participation in society. Thus, although the inter-
ests at stake are not subject to strict scrutiny, courts have refused
to give constitutional ratification to regulations that infringe upon
such interests.' 73 The result has been judicial implementation of the
hybrid irrebuttable presumption doctrine or, alternatively, determi-
nations that no rational relationship whatsoever exists," in order to
render unconstitutional regulations that the traditional equal pro-
tection analysis would have left undisturbed. -
As the movement away from polarized equal protection standards
progresses, the focus of equal protection analysis will shift corre-
spondingly to an examination of the values impinged upon and the
countervailing state interest in the regulation. Coupled with this
new focus, the disposal of the talismanic labels of suspect class and
fundamental right should improve the likelihood that equal protec-
tion challenges to employment practices which discriminate against
qualified handicapped persons will succeed.' 75
171. See Gunther, supra note 159.
172. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 99. (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
173. See id.
174. Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
175. In a recent decision, however, the Supreme Court applied the rational basis standard
to an equal protection challenge of the Foreign Service Act's mandatory retirement provision.
Vance v. Bradley, 47 U.S.L.W. 4176 (1979). In Vance, the Court reiterated the principle that
"judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely [the Court] may
think a political branch has acted." Id. at 4177. The legitimate statutory goal, assurance of
the competence and the mental and physical re'liability of Foreign Service personnel, was
furthered by the means chosen, compulsory retirement at age sixty. Although overseas condi-
tions are not always more strenuous than those of domestic placement and although not all
individuals over sixty are incapable of meeting the physical and mental standards for Foreign
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PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
A major criticism of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is that the
legislation is not sufficiently comprehensive. Commentators main-
tain that because the Act applies only to recipients of federal assis-
tance and to federal contractors rather than to all private employ-
ers, handicapped workers' freedom of choice is circumscribed in
violation of their civil rights. ' Absent a comprehensive federal sta-
tutory scheme, the power to regulate private sector employers ex-
empt from sections 503 or 504 rests with the states. Although nearly
all states have enacted legislation safeguarding the rights of the
handicapped, the statutes vary greatly in the degree of protection
offered.'77
Service, perfection of "mathematical nicety" of a classification is not required constitution-
ally. Id. at 4180 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)). As long as the
line drawn by the classification is not irrational the Court cannot overturn the statute. Id.
at 4181.
Vance may signal a retreat by the Court to the traditional, mechanistic application of equal
protection standards. The potential implication for the handicapped in public employment
would be that, if any rational relation to a legitimate state purpose can be established, such
as health, safety, or even administrative convenience, the statute barring the handicapped
from employment would be upheld as constitutional. For example, a state-funded hospital's
hiring policy that categorically excluded deaf applicants from employment as nurses would
be upheld as rationally related to the legitimate goals of health and safety of its patients,
even though some individuals might be capable of performing the job.
The Court in Vance did not apply the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, although the
policy of mandatory retirement arguably constituted a conclusive presumption in violation
of due process. Consequently, the continued vitality of that doctrine remains unclear.
176. Wright, Equal Treatment of the Handicapped by Federal Contractors, 26 EMORY L.J.
65 (1977); Proposed, supra note 4; Note, Potluck Protection for Handicapped Discriminatees:
The Need to Amend Title VII to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 8 Loy.
Cm. L.J. 814 (1976); Note, Access to Buildings and Equal Employment for the Disabled,
Survey of State Statutes, 50 TEMPLE L.Q. 1067, 1079 (1977); Note, Civil Rights-Employment
Rights of the Physically Handicapped, 79 W. VA. L. REv. 398, 406 (1977).
177. ALA. CODE tit. 21, § 7-8 (1975); ALAsKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Cum. Supp. 1978); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 82-2901 (Repl. Vol. 1976); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1735 (Deering Cum. Supp. 1978);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-801 (1973); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126 (West Cum. Supp.
1978); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 6-1504 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 413.08(3)
(West Cum. Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1702 (Cum. Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. §
21-378-2 (Repl. Vol. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 56-707 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 65-23 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-7-5-6 (Bums Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601D.2
(West 1975); KAN. STAT. § 44-413 (1973); Ky. REv. STAT. § 207.150 (Repl. Vol. 1977); LA. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 38-2315 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4552 (1979); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, § 14 (Cum. Supp. 1978); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 24k (West Cum.
Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAws § 37.1101-1605 (Cum. Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.12
(West Cum. Supp. 1978); Miss. CODE ANN § 43-6-15 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
286.200,.205 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 64-304 (Cum. Supp. 1977);
1978] EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS OF THE HANDICAPPED
In contrast to the restrictive scope of the Rehabilitation Act, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex, or national origin by any employer in any
industry affecting interstate commerce that employs fifteen or more
persons.'7 8 Under the auspices of the broad-reaching commerce
power, Title VII covers nearly all employers. The apparent similar-
ity of problems faced by minorities and the handicapped has
prompted a number of legislative proposals,' encouraged by favor-
able commentary,' to extend Title VII's comprehensive coverage to
encompass handicapped individuals. These proposals, however,
have been consistently unsuccessful.
Although incorporating certain procedural aspects of Title VII
into the Rehabilitation Act might increase the protection afforded
handicapped persons,"8' the proposed alternative of consolidating
NEv. REv. STAT. § 613.330 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-C (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.J.
REV. STAT. § 10: 5-29.1 (Supp. 1978) (blind only); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-7 (Supp. 1975);
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1972-1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. 128-15.3 (Cum. Supp.
1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-13-05 (Repl. Vol. 1978); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (Page
Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.405 (1975); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § (Purdon Supp. 1978-
1979); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 28-5-7 (Cum. Supp. 1977); S.C. CODE § 43-33-60 (1976); S.D. COM-
PIED LAWS ANN. § 60-7 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 498 (1978); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-
28.7 (Repl. Vol. 1976); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-
9 (Cum. Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
The statutes vary from mere establishment of committees on the employment rights of the
handicapped to comprehensive enforcement of employment rights. Some states limit cover-
age to employees of state-funded programs or activities or contractors doing business with
the state; others include the handicapped in state civil rights legislation covering race, reli-
gion, sex, and ethnic origin. Sanctions imposed for noncompliance with the statutes range
from misdemeanor penalties to discontinuation of state funding.
178. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Title VII provides in pertinent
part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin . ..
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
179. H.R. 1107, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. H209 (1977); H.R. 461, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H193 (1977); H.R. 12,654, 93 Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 2441
(1974); H.R. 13,199, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 4976 (1974); H.R. 10,962 Cong., 1st
Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 33,884 (1971).
180. See note 176 supra.
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (Supp. V 1975). The remedies provided by Title VII include
affirmative relief, back pay, preliminary injunctions, conciliatory relief, private actions, and
damages. The statute also authorizes suits against a "pattern or practice" of discrimination,
which "enables the [glovemment to mount a coordinated attack on the largest or most
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handicapped rights into Title VII is not practicable. The unique and
complex nature of a handicapping condition necessitates treatment
independent of Title VII.15 Separate treatment allows the develop-
ment of legislative and administrative mechanisms adapted to the
special needs of the disabled. This contention is supported by the
critical distinction between the handicapped and the minorities
protected by Title VII: a handicap may impose actual limitations
on an individual's employability. ' Cognizant of this distinction,
sections 503 and 504 attempt to maximize the labor potential of the
handicapped and to eliminate the discriminatory effects of preju-
dice and ignorance within valid physical, mental, and economic
constraints. Therefore, the more feasible method of effectuating the
employment rights of the handicapped is through reform and ex-
pansion of the protection afforded by the current Rehabilitation Act
provisions, rather than through attempting to merge the disabled
with civil rights legislation ill-equipped to respond to the special
needs and problems of handicapped workers.
AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROPOSAL
Effective enforcement of the general standards established by the
Rehabilitation Act would be furthered by the formation of an inte-
grated advisory body at the federal level. The functions of this body
would include research, publication, and recommendation. The cre-
ation of a coordinated council concerned solely with the employ-
ment opportunities of handicapped persons could provide informed
guidance to employers and employees affected by the Act.
The research function would entail consultation with profession-
als, handicapped individuals, and employers regarding technology,
industry patterns, and economic factors, as well as mental and
flagrant violators of Title VII." Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1229 (1971). Amendment of
the Rehabilitation Act to provide for similar remedies would strengthen the enforcement of
the Act's provision.
Employers, however, are less likely to intentionally violate the Rehabilitation Act. Rather,
economic factors likely would encourage noncompliance.
The Title VII affirmative action requirements of goals, timetables, and workforce analysis
are not repeated in the Rehabilitation Act. These requirements are more difficult to apply in
the context of employment of handicapped individuals for the same reasons that inclusion of
the disabled under Title VII coverage would prove problematic.
182. See note 133 supra & accompanying text.
183. See Wright, supra note 176, at 100-02.
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physical characteristics of particular disabilities. In order to define
such troublesome statutory terminology as "qualified handicapped
individual," "job-related," or "reasonable accommodation" with
any degree of specificity, empirical studies would have to be con-
ducted in a systematic and categorical fashion. Potential areas of
research concentration include (A) job analysis, (B) handicap anal-
ysis, (C) accommodation analysis, (D) job qualifications analysis,
and (E) industry analysis. These areas then could be reduced to
specific functions and related cost and technology factors. From this
research,- guidelines could be formulated for employers and employ-
ees. The following example demonstrates the operation and applica-
tion of this analysis.
Job A is determined through research to consist of the essential
functions x, y, z, w, & s:
x = communication (oral, written, aural)
y = mobility (walking)
z = motor skills (fine motor, gross motor)
w = specific job skills (typing)
s = subjective factors (personality)
Handicap B is discovered to affect mobility (y) in the majority
of cases.
The applicant with handicap B is a paraplegic confined to a
wheelchair but possessing full use of all upper torso functions.
Accommodation C consists of the following modifications and
expense:
a) wheelchair / cost $x
b) widened doors / cost $y
c) ramps / cost $z
d) bathroom facilities / cost $q
Job Qua.lifications D: The job tests and pre-employment inquir-
ies used to evaluate an applicant's capacity to perform Job A
consider:
x = communication
y = mobility
z = motor
The qualifications may not evaluate functions other than those
listed under Job A as essential; overbroad tests violate the provi-
sions of the Act.184
Industry Analysis E: Based upon empirical studies evaluating the
size of the employer's business, type of operation, number of
184. See notes 69-70 supra & accompanying text.
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employees, and annual profit, the reasonable budget allowable
for accommodation for handicapped workers by Industry E is $R.
Within each category (A-E), the input of professionals, handi-
capped individuals, and employers would be required to identify
and quantify the various factors as accurately as possible.
In this example, an applicant possessing handicap B cannot per-
form the essential function y of Job A. If the cost of the accommoda-
tion C factors does not exceed $R, however, the employer must make
the accommodation necessary for handicap B; if the cost of accom-
modation exceeds $R, an undue hardship is imposed and no duty
to accommodate arises. Job qualifications D must be limited to
assessments of factors listed under A as essential to job perform-
ance. The threshold presumption that an applicant with handicap
B cannot perform function y is rebuttable.
Research related to each of the above categories of analysis then
would be published by the proposed advisory board and dissemi-
nated to employers and to government agencies concerned with
rights of the handicapped. Finally, the advisory body would draft
a recommended plan for voluntary, affirmative action hiring poli-
cies and procedures that state agencies could be encouraged to im-
plement.
The proposed advisory body also might study and propose addi-
tional reforms, including (1) expansion of section 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act to reach the remaining one-half of private employers,
commensurate with the broad coverage provided under Title VII;
(2) federal subsidy of the cost of accommodation exceeding the $R
amount; or (3) an increase in tax exemptions allotted to employers
accommodating handicapped workers. Moreover, establishment of
the proposed advisory board generally would strengthen the enforce-
ment, broaden the scope, and clarify the teminology of Rehabilita-
tion Act provisions.
CONCLUSION
The right of qualified handicapped individuals to obtain employ-
ment free from discriminatory practices has been expanded by re-
cent legislative and judicial action. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
provides the primary vehicle for enforcement of these employment
rights. The Act, however, suffers from generalized standards and
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incomprehensive coverage. Modification of the Rehabilitation Act,
rather than inclusion of the disabled under Title VII, is the appro-
priate remedy for these infirmities. Formation of a federal advisory
board to research problems related to the employment of handi-
capped persons and to recommend solutions, expansion of section
504 to all private sector employers, and implementation of federal
compensation and tax relief to employers who accommodate the
handicapped would strengthen the enforcement provisions of the
Act and clarify the statutory standards. Additional support for chal-
lenges to discriminatory employment practices may be drawn from
the constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process.
ToNI M. MASSARO
